














The Two Cultures and Big Data Research 
EYTAN ADAR 
Abstract: The ongoing struggle in the integration of Big Data 
methodology into the social science “toolkit” is due, in no 
small part, to the gulf between the “two cultures” of research.  
Those that produce and work with explanatory models (the 
first culture) criticize the primarily predictive models (the 
second) produced as part of Big Data research.  While often 
the debate does not acknowledge the role of models as a 
fundamental point of contention, it nonetheless underlies 
much of the discourse.  By better appreciating this difference 
and finding ways in which to integrate models, Big Data 
social science will become better integrated in the general 
social science research practice.  The goal of this work is to 
critically examine the existing gap, the consequences of its 
existence, and possible resolutions. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 The use—current and potential—of Big Data for social science 
research has brought to light a significant number of tensions between 
different academic sub-communities. The lack of an agreed-upon 
definition for Big Data has exacerbated the situation and created a 
major expectation gap. Both critics and proponents of Big Data 
research are responsible for highlighting anecdotal evidence of the 
failure or success of Big Data—on occasion citing the same case study 
(e.g., Google’s “flu trends work” (Ginsberg et al. 2008)). At the 
extremes, Big Data in the view of some researchers is either (a) 
entirely new, —the ”[B]ig [D]ata will revolutionize research” 
community (Anderson 2008, 2) or (b) nothing new—the  ”[B]ig [D]ata 
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1787).1  Neither extreme, nor the practice of identifying anecdotal 
evidence to argue for one or the other, is a particularly helpful practice 
as it fails to address the underlying differences and their roots in the 
debate over scientific practice.  The worst offenders of this “extremist” 
viewpoint are often media who are tasked with translating scientific 
discourse (and who often benefit from the appearance of a “battle”).  
However, the press often models itself on the existing culture clash—
one being fought in public, rather than academic, contexts (Marcus 
and Davis 2014; Hidalgo 2014, 1). 
 Specifically, this clash emerges due to different modes of scientific 
practice and objectives. Traditionally, the social science community 
has focused on explanatory models (and constructed data),2 whereas 
those in the computational sciences have targeted predictive models 
(and observational or “found” data). The latter often represents “Big 
Data research.” The perspective that these two modes of inquiry are 
somehow incompatible is detrimental to scientific progress and blinds 
academics to the benefits of other perspectives. 
 The current discourse is harmful to the way in which academia, the 
public, and policy makers engage with, and adopt, Big Data practices.  
Furthermore, the confounding of academic and industrial practice of 
Big Data under one name further fuels the debate.  It makes it difficult 
to hold the position of being for academic Big Data practices, but 
against aspects of corporate practice (which amplify ethical concerns) 
since, from a high-level, they appear to be one and the same.  This 
particular feature will hopefully become irrelevant as we move away 
from the “Big Data” moniker and adopt more specific ways of 
discriminating between techniques, applications, and values. 
 Regardless, my contention—and the focus of this paper—is that 
the differences between the two modes of research are important to 
understand and, more critically, the ability to utilize both is critical to 
our understanding of social phenomena in both the theoretical and 
applied sense. While Big Data veers toward the 
predictive/observational due to various structural reasons, it 
nonetheless offers significant benefits to those working in domains 
that demand theoretically grounded, explanatory models. Rather than 
fixating on these extremes, there is an opportunity to identify ways in 
which both modes of work can be used effectively in complementary 





1 As with any debate, there are those that take a more nuanced stance that both considers 
the benefits and highlights the concerns (Boyd and Crawford 2012, 671).  Nonetheless, the 
framing of many of these concerns, I believe, relates to the models of inquiry. 
2 Although the broad range of social science sub-disciplines make it difficult to completely 
generalize, this is nonetheless a widely held belief. 
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which there is a Big Data analog—will need to find some way to 
incorporate the large-scale computational techniques of Big Data. 
II. EXPLANATORY AND PREDICTIVE 
 In some sense, the distinction between explanatory and predictive 
models is highly nuanced. The difference is deeply philosophical in its 
relation to the objective of scientific inquiry and an active area of 
debate (Breiman 2001, 199; Shmueli 2010, 289). The similarity between 
the two is most simply represented by Figure 1, which abstractly 
captures both approaches. 
 
 
Figure 1: The abstract model (adapted from Breiman 2001) 
 
 The specific elements in both model types are the same, but the 
objective of the inquiry is often different. Broadly, we seek to 
understand the relationship between some variable X and some other 
variable Y.  A predictive model focuses on predicting Y given X (see 
Figure 2) i.e., identifying a function f(X)ÆY. The function may be some 
type of regression (e.g. linear or logistic) or classifier. Notably, the 
function need not emulate the true underlying relationship between 
the two variables. In fact, the relationship need not be causal at all—
“nature” may be driving both X and Y simultaneously. A correlational 
relationship, where X is a leading indicator for Y, may be as desirable 
as a true causal model in the case of predictive modeling. For 
example, one could predict the probability of purchasing some item 






Figure 2: Prediction (adapted from Breiman 2001) 
 
 A distinguishing feature of predictive models in the context of Big 
Data is that data is often found (or observed) rather than constructed. 
In contrast, an explanatory model (Figure 3) is focused on the causal 
process (the “nature”) that mediates the input and output. Most often, 
through a careful collection of data from controlled experiments, self-
report (e.g., surveys), or other methodologies, it becomes possible to 
isolate the relationships between the different scientific objects (often 
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theoretical constructs in the social sciences).  These theoretical 
constructs and associated theories are key features of this approach.  
One could, for example, model purchasing behavior by understanding 
the influence of factors such as brand recognition, reputation, or social 
influence. These operationalized objects can be isolated and tested in 
a way that lends confidence—often through specific regression 
models—to a specific causal interpretation that connects to an 
underlying theory. Though often these causal models are not, in fact, 
true causal models in the statistical sense, the underlying theory is 
viewed as justification of the causal argument (Shmueli 2010, 290).  
Experimentally derived evidence is often held in highest regard, but it 
is not always possible to achieve, and the specific method of deriving 
data is not as critical as the controlled construction of the data. 
 
 
 A predictive model may seek to identify key leading indicators that 
can be leveraged to predict some outcome (other tasks may involve 
classification or repairing missing data). While we would often like 
these predictors to be theoretically motivated, they can be obtained 
through other mechanisms (e.g., data mining). In some sense, a 
predictive model is about simply being able to predict something, not 
about determining why something happens. Conversely, a good 
explanatory model may not work well as a predictive model. While the 
causal relations would, in theory, imply that Y can be predicted 
through X as the “flow” between them is captured, the confidence in 
that prediction may be incredibly small. Furthermore, there are many 
situations where it is difficult or impossible to practically capture X. 
For example, X and Y may occur too closely in a temporal sense or X 
may be hard to operationalize (e.g., requiring a complicated 
psychological assessment survey). 
 
 
Figure 3: Explanation (adapted from Breiman 2001) 
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 Despite their similar structures, a good predictive model need not 
be a good explanatory model. This subtlety is by no means obvious, 
and from the perspective of the press, the public, some policy makers, 
and even some scientists, the relationship can be completely 
misunderstood.  
A. Prediction and Forecasting 
 A further source of confusion derives from the use of the word 
“predictive.” As predictive, in conventional language, implies some 
assertion about the future, this has created an ambiguity that extends 
from academia to the public. Predictive models are often “predictive” 
in the statistical case, where a function can map some input X to some 
output Y. For example, a regression fit to some observed dataset may 
be such a function. However, Y need not be a future observation. We 
may accurately model the relationship between tweets and votes 
during a particular election cycle (e.g., for every x units of increase in 
tweets for a particular candidate, we observe a change of y in the 
number of votes). This model may simply capture the relationship in 
an interesting way or allows us to infer missing data. However, for 
various reasons, this particular model may not work for a future 
election. To distinguish between the two types of predictions, I will 
adopt the notion of forecasting as a specific sub-type of predictive 
modeling, one that may work ex ante. 
 This difference in fact forms part of the arguments against Big 
Data. Critics of Big Data techniques often point to the inability of 
predictive models to function as forecasting tools. For example, the 
use of Twitter as a sensor for votes and the accuracy of Google Flu 
Trends have been heavily criticized (Metaxas, Mustafaraj, and Gayo-
Avello 2011, 165; Marcus and Davis 2014, 2-3). The models work well at 
a particular time or for a particular election cycle, but fail beyond this. 
The failure to forecast is perceived as a general failure of predictive 
models. Perhaps worse, those criticizing the models often focus on 
singular failures as signs of a more general problem. 
 On the other hand, those creating the models often oversell the 
forecasting power of the models (Huberty 2012, 1). Or, put more 
generously, they are unable to counteract the misinterpretations of 
what they meant by “predictive.” While ideally predictive models are 
“stable” across time, and therefore function to forecast, the reality is 
that they often require active recalibration (Lazer et al. 2014, 1204). 
Thus, while the “signs” in the models may remain correct (i.e., more 
tweets or more searches are correlated positively with more votes or 
more illness), the magnitude of those relationships may dramatically 
change over time. 
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 Rather than resorting to ambiguous definitions to further a point, 
it is far more mutually advantageous to provide crisper definitions of 
the goals of the models, their nature, and their limitations (as well as 
recognizing the existence of “fixes” to those limitations). 
B. The Black Box and the Unknown 
 To summarize our simple model (Figures 1-3), explanatory models 
seek to understand the “black box,” whereas predictive models are 
content leaving it as “unknown.” The distinction exists more broadly 
depending on the domain. In statistics, for example, this has taken the 
form of the “two cultures” debate (data models versus predictive 
models). This debate is roughly analogous to the 
explanatory/predictive split in the social sciences, if not in precise 
structure than certainly at a high level (Breiman 2001, 199). Other 
fields (e.g., epidemiology) have more successfully bridged the gap by 
using the different methods as part of an overall toolbox. Similarly, 
those in the fields of biology and chemistry, with the new focus on 
large-scale experimentation (e.g., microarrays), have been forced to 
build new ways of incorporating big data into their scientific practice. 
Interestingly, the different disciplines have adopted different 
strategies to incorporate the different methods. The social sciences 
have been much slower to create this bridge. 
 The educational system for social science academics has advocated 
one view to the exclusion of the other. The result has been a deeper 
philosophical divide that has contributed to the strong reactions 
between the communities and has materialized in the extreme opinions 
around Big Data. This is not to claim that the early adopters of the 
predictive/observational side were completely prepared for the nature 
of Big Data, which nonetheless requires new methods, but they were 
certainly more prepared.  In particular, the “realities” of the data 
gathered through observational means forced the construction of new 
techniques and research designs. While the lack of “controls” in this 
type of data is deeply uncomfortable to the explanatory side, it fit 
naturally in the predictive side. 
III. UNOBTRUSIVE AND NON-REACTIVITY IN BIG DATA 
 The choice of the modeling style is inexorably tied to the nature of 
data itself. The “data” part of Big Data—at least when it comes to the 
kind most suitable for social science research—is often collected not 
through experimental procedures, but r a t h e r  through observation—
the logging of behavioral traces (often in “uncontrolled” 
environments). Occasionally this collection is explicit, but more likely it 
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is a secondary artifact of the information production and consumption 
process of people living their ordinary digital lives. 
 Social scientists have names for this kind of data—unobtrusive or 
non-reactive data. Though the names are often used interchangeably, 
the difference is somewhat critical in the case of Big Data social science 
as it forms another point of contention (Tufekci 2014, 1-10). 
Specifically, unobtrusive observational data most often refers to data 
collected without the awareness of the subject. Non-reactive data is 
data that is collected in a way that will not influence the subject’s 
behavior. 
 Arguably, one would like both properties to be true—the subject is 
unaware and unaffected. Unfortunately, while data can be non-reactive 
at the time of the collection and simultaneously unobtrusive (e.g., 
collecting political tweets), the outcome of this research often 
provokes a reaction in the study population (Tufekci 2014, 1-3; Cueni 
and Frey 2014). In the political tweets example, the revelation that 
tweets are somehow correlated with election results may lead a 
political operative to produce additional tweets—an attempt to “game” 
the system. A more obvious example may be a fund trading on stocks 
mentioned through social media. Having found some leading indicator 
in the signal, the company acts on the signal but consequently 
“corrupts” the signal when they move the market. Any advantage of 
the signal may be reduced over time.  
 While “undesirable” from the perspective of science,3 reactivity is 
often part of the reality of Big Data as often the data being collected is 
being collected specifically to predict and modify whatever behavior 
was being observed. For example, search logs are collected to improve 
search, consequently causing changes in search behaviors and 
influencing the models. Purchasing logs are used to model and modify 
purchasing behavior and so on. More subtly, changes in the 
underlying system that are beyond the control of the modeler can 
create havoc in the predictive power of the system. A criticism of the 
Google Flu Trends project raised this potential issue—that the 
modifications of search behavior and user interfaces by one team at 
Google would change the data observed by the data miners in 
significant and uncontrolled ways (Lazer. et al. 2014, 1204). 
 Social science research using nonreactive/unobtrusive information 
began in the 1960s (Webb et al. 1999, 5) and often involved creative 
collection of information that could be transformed into an 
instrument for the construct in question, but was often a “by-product” 





3 If data is reactive, the stability or generalizability of the model can be brought into 
question—an undesirable characteristic for both predictive and explanatory models.  
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popular in an art gallery, it was proposed that the rate in which tiles 
were replaced in front of different pieces was a good indicator. To find 
out how frightening a children’s story was, one only needed to 
measure the tightness of the circle children made around a fire during 
a campfire telling. To identify on which radio station a car dealer 
should advertise, they could simply look at what their customers were 
tuned to when bringing their cars in for servicing. Modern examples 
of this have yielded more significant commercial and scientific 
outcomes. For example, to judge the likely revenues of a Wal-Mart 
store, it was proposed that the number of cars in the parking lot, as 
identified in a satellite image, was a good proxy for customers and, 
therefore, business (Javers 2010). The large scale “garbage project” 
looked through the physical trash left curbside by residents in order to 
understand patterns of consumption (Rathje and Murphy 2001, 13-
14). This kind of data is noticeably “distant” from the construct of 
interest. Arguably, other measures would better tell us about the 
popularity of art pieces (cameras in front of every piece or exit 
interviews), the scariness of a story (galvanic skin response sensors 
and heart rate monitors on every child), or the best place to advertise 
or what is being consumed and why (survey instruments and focus 
groups). However, often the best measures are expensive or hard to 
create. 
 Despite their obvious utility in certain contexts, unobtrusive 
measures have received negative attention since they were first 
introduced (Webb and Weick 1979, 211-212). The data is viewed as 
noisy and, because it is somewhat uncontrolled, thought to be less 
scientific. This argument has extended to the Big Data era as many of 
the data products being used in this type of research have a similar 
structure. As such, they have been called everything from “found 
data” (a more neutral term) to “data exhaust” or “data fumes” (a more 
polarizing term). 
 It is worth noting that techniques for utilizing observational data 
in general, and unobtrusive data specifically, have long been extended 
and refined. Multiple models, methods, and instruments are often 
brought to bear on a study to test multiple angles. Noise is accounted 
for explicitly and, in fact, often this noise is embraced as another 
source of data (Webb et al. 1999, 39).   Regardless, the tidal wave of 
observational Big Data does not appear to be dwindling.  Simply 
ignoring it because it is more difficult to use in conventional ways is a 
limiting perspective, which we would do well to overcome. 
A. The Focus on Predictive 
 It is worth briefly addressing the sources of observational data that 
is being made available for social science research which is often the 
2015] ADAR 773 
 
data produced by large corporate and government entities.  Many of 
these entities make this data directly available to researchers—though 
not always in easy to collect ways (e.g., rate limited APIs, data in 
PDFs, limited sharing rules, etc.). To focus the present discussion—
and because they are a likely a source of a majority of Big Data 
datasets—we can narrow our analysis to Internet-based producers (such 
as Twitter, Facebook, Microsoft, Google, eBay, Reddit, and Kiva). 
 The most immediate objection to data obtained from these sources 
is that the lack of specific documentation and control over many 
elements of the data collection pipeline, as well as the particular biases 
of the corporation, will constrain the research questions that can be 
asked. Though some research has been attempted to reverse-engineer 
the properties of the data (Morstatter et al. 2013, 1), in many situations 
the particular stream is undocumented and can change at any time. 
 While there are many companies that are positioned to help social 
science research, there is rarely a perfect alignment between 
commercial and academic research interests.  Clearly, the agenda of 
companies will focus the kinds of questions they ask and consequently 
the kinds of data they capture: can I understand my customers and 
predict what they will do next? For example, if they search for 
“apples” on my search engine, what will they click on next?  Or, if they 
searched for apples, how likely is it that they will purchase an apple? 
And finally, given that they are about to buy an apple, what ads do I 
show them so they will buy a specific kind of apple? Many of these 
questions can be answered directly through observational data 
collection or log data (e.g., behavioral traces of end-user interactions).  
Given enough data, and some randomization, it is possible to identify 
a large enough cohort to achieve predictive aims. Put another way, we 
can observe enough people searching for “apple” to begin to develop a 
predictive model of how likely they are to buy an apple (many search 
vendors can track a user beyond the search site through cookies or so-
called “toolbar” data to identify a “hit” on a shopping site). 
 While observational data is present in great quantities, often 
experimental data collection can also be undertaken—so called A/B 
testing. Under A/B testing, different service variants can be used to 
identify those that produce a “better” behavior. The standard 
reductionist example of this type of experiment is whether the color or 
text of the “buy now” button, or the advertisement on the site, 
encourages more active purchasing behavior. For a company, there is 
a tradeoff in using this kind of technique as it more directly answers 
specific questions (which color button is better?), but may not be 
broadly useable in “log mining” contexts. While established 
companies have learned to keep track of interface versions or which 
A/B condition their end-users are exposed to, this is not true for all and 
may impact the predictive task. This last point has a direct 
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consequence to researchers using of logs in secondary contexts. Very 
rarely are researchers aware of the particular conditions under which 
data was collected and incorrect assumptions may result in 
questionable study validity. 
 Finally, it is worth pointing out that, even though A/B testing has 
the appearance of standard scientific experimental procedures, it 
would be a mistake to confuse the two. While some A/B testing can be 
used downstream for explanatory modeling, this is not always the 
case. For example, A/B tests are not necessarily theory-driven and a 
test condition can be designed that compares alternatives, but does not 
test a particular theory. Specifically, our hypothetical search vendor 
may show two different ads (half of the end-users get one, the other half 
get the other) to determine which one is clicked on more. There is no 
theory in this experiment—it is simply the testing of alternatives. This 
is not to say that an A/B test cannot become a “scientific” experiment, 
but rather that companies are not incentivized for this. 
 Facebook’s recent “emotion manipulation” experiment reflects an 
interesting case study (for many reasons) in that it arguably fit into 
both categories (Kramer et al. 2014, 8788). The study manipulated the 
exposure of end-users to positive and negative posts (randomly hiding 
posts with particular keywords) to identify the influence on the end-
user’s own posts. The study both had a potential benefit to the company 
(e.g., understanding how your posting behavior varies from your 
“neighbor’s” may be used to design interfaces or algorithms that 
encourage posting behavior), as well as scientific inquiry (e.g., how 
emotional contagion may work (Fowler and Christakis 2008)). This 
is, unfortunately (again, for many reasons), a rare instance of research 
where academic and corporate interests were aligned closely enough 
to create an interventional study (likely to become even rarer given the 
particularly negative response to the study). 
 It is possible, of course, for social science researchers to develop 
their own infrastructures for collecting Big Data. At the University of 
Michigan, for example, we have begun to develop and deploy the 
MTogether system,4 an observational and interventional platform built 
into desktop and mobile platforms that tracks social media use and 
can “manipulate” a user’s experience. The initial releases were 
designed to leverage the alumni and fan base for Michigan—big in the 
“little b” sense. However, platforms such as MTogether are hard to get 
right; they are expensive to develop and deploy, and the sustained 
uptake or growth of the platform is still uncertain. Successful 
companies are able to provide extrinsic and intrinsic motivations to 
their customers. It is an open question whether research platforms 





4 University of Michigan, “MTogether”, http://www.mtogether.us (2014). 
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 To conclude, the particular incentives of corporations have notably 
biased Big Data toward the observational/predictive side of the 
spectrum. Social science researchers who are unwilling or unable to 
engage with this type of data are often left out of Big Data research. 
This by no means indicates that research using other types of data or 
methodologies are, or will become, irrelevant, but this does point to a 
particular fracture between sub-communities that needs to be mended 
or at the very least more deeply understood.  
IV. THE VIRTUOUS CYCLE 
 Having focused on the differences in research philosophies that 
have led to divisiveness around Big Data research, it is worth 
considering mechanisms by which these may not only be bridged, but 
also linked in a mutually beneficial way. 
A. Education 
 The introduction of Big Data techniques has led to the creation of 
new opportunities for students to gain experience. Programs such as 
the Interdisciplinary Committee on Organizational Studies (ICOS) at 
the University of Michigan offer a yearly “boot camp” on Big Data for 
researchers in the social sciences (largely PhD students). The week-
long intensive seminar is co-sponsored by both the Colleges of 
Engineering, Literature, and Science & Arts. The goals of the camp, 
and others like it, is to train students to leverage Big Data resources 
(e.g., Twitter’s data stream) and tools (e.g., iPython). The camp exists, 
in part, because “[i]t is a good bet that within a few years, a standard 
part of graduate training in the social sciences will include a hefty 
dose of ‘how to make use of big data,’ just as statistical analysis is a 
standard part of such training today.” (ICOS 2014)  Other disciplines 
have similarly incorporated the computational techniques that are 
necessary for Big Data research into their educational culture and 
there is no reason to believe that the social sciences will be unable to do 
so. 
B. Model Feedback Loops 
 There is a great deal of potential for the inclusion of the predictive 
models that are a key part of the Big Data world. The relationship of 
predictive and explanatory models has long been a topic of discussion, 
though not always in the context of social science research or Big Data 
specifically. Shmueli (Shmueli 2010, 289) has reviewed a number of 
ways in which explanatory and predictive models can work in concert. 
We briefly summarize a few key points about the value of predictive 
modeling raised in this work (Shmueli 2010, 292): 
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New data contexts – Predictive models often serve as a way of 
engaging with new datasets about which no hypotheses have been 
formed. New media data (e.g., social media) does not always fall into 
the classical forms (what other forms of communication are limited to 
140 characters?). Predictive models can help to understand these 
datasets. 
 
1. New measure generation – Predictive models can be leveraged 
to discover new measures and test their operationalization. 
 
2. Connection to practice – The use of predictive models can test 
the practical/applied validity of explanatory models. 
Furthermore, an explanatory model that is used in a predictive 
context, but which does not perform as well as a predictive 
model, may point to the potential to improve theory. 
 
3. Tests for competing theories – Due to their assessment 
mechanisms (e.g., accuracy), predictive models often have a 
more natural support for comparing competing theories. 
 
 Conversely, theory and explanatory models can serve to improve 
predictive models as well. For example, theoretical models allow us to 
test predictive outcomes and assess the long-term potential of a 
predictive model. The relationship between the S&P 500 and the 
Bangladeshi butter supply (where the latter can predict the former) has 
long been viewed as an example of data mining gone awry (Leinweber 
2007, 16). Though the butter supply has predictive power, it clearly 
does not make much rational sense and is likely to fail when applied as 
a forecasting tool. Theory about market systems would likely tell us 
that this particular indicator should be removed from consideration in 
the predictive model. 
 Additionally, explanatory models have the practical purpose of 
helping in the feature-engineering task that is often a key factor in the 
design of predictive models. Having some insight into the causal 
model can guide the creation of these features and can focus the effort 
of the researcher.  A recent paper at the International Conference on 
Weblogs and Social Media (ICWSM) received a best paper award 
(Lietz et al. 2014, 7) for an analysis of the German elections using 
Twitter data.  The work did not attempt to predict the election, but 
rather study it from the perspective of theoretical constructs that were 
carefully operationalized and tested on Twitter data. These “features” 
are hopefully more robust than the traditional “bag-of-words” 
approach that has been used in Twitter analysis and are likely to be 
more robust over time—leading to true forecasting, rather than simple 
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prediction, and deeper insights about the social processes around 
elections. 
C. Triangulation 
 No particular research methodology—interviews, surveys, lab 
experiments, or any other applied within the social sciences—is 
completely immune to criticism.  Each has limitations with no obvious 
“fix” (e.g., bad self-reports on surveys, interviewer bias, ecological 
validity, biased sampling, small-N’s, etc.).  
 The existence of multiple approaches should be viewed positively 
as it allows us, as scientists, to test and validate our ideas of how 
individuals and social systems work. In part, this validation through 
multiple studies is a better standard—one that should be attractive to 
those trying to understand social phenomena in a robust way. 
Researchers who take advantage of nonreactive measures (Webb et al. 
1999, 16) have long been aware of the fact that multiples of everything 
(instruments, methods, models, etc.) leads to more robust findings.  It 
is worth taking this advice to heart and finding better ways to tie 
techniques together.   
V. ETHICAL CONCERNS 
 The integration of Big Data research into the social science toolbox 
has led to extensive discussion about ethical considerations. Though 
much of this criticism has been targeted more broadly at corporate 
interests, it is nonetheless critical to understand the context of 
research as well, especially as the two are often intertwined either in 
perception or in reality. In particular, as academic social science 
researchers begin to either leverage the output of corporate interests 
(e.g., Twitter) or collaborate with their corporate counterparts, ethical 
concerns become crucial to understand and address. The recent 
Facebook emotional contagion study vividly demonstrates this 
(Kramer et al. 2014, 8790). The extremely high variance in the 
response from the public, academics, the press, ethicists, and corporate 
interests demonstrates that we have not yet converged on a completely 
satisfactory solution that can balance the demands of scientists, the 
public, and corporate interests. 
 The design of policy and the education of the public are clearly 
crucial, but along with these it is clear that more discussion needs to 
occur within the scientific community. The opinion on ethicality of the 
Facebook study was roughly split, with computational scientists 
arguing that it was ethical and the more traditional side arguing that it 
was not. This is unfortunate for a number of reasons, one being that it 
reinforces the tension between these communities. Hopefully, the 
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ongoing attempts at a productive dialog around Big Data ethics will 
provide a foundation for broader collaboration.  
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 The contemporary definition of Big Data around the three V’s—
volume, velocity, and variety (Gartner 2014)—is a beguiling one. It 
captures some of the high level properties of the data, but fails to 
engage with the nuances of how it is used and what scientific insights 
can be gleaned from it. Simplifying definitions and anecdotes 
collected from the press cannot be the best way to move forward for 
social science research. Rather, critiques of the specific methods and 
engagement with the limitations and benefits of different models and 
data sources would seem to be better choices. Our ability to do so 
ensures that we are able to educate future social science researchers 
and expand their toolbox of techniques. This is a matter not only of 
pursuing “the right tool for the job,” but also of leveraging the 
complementary strengths of the different modes of scientific inquiry. 
This is not to say that we should stop with understanding the specific 
properties of the tools. The use of Big Data has re-opened debates 
within academia around ethical data use. It is clear that, in addition to 
developing new ways to mine data or integrate theory, these concerns 
should form a key part of the discussion. 
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